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Theories of the Self abound both across and within disciplines. Following a 
discussion of two frameworks for understanding the Self—the essentialist and 
the dialogic—we explore the nature of what we call the rhizomal Self. Through 
autobiographical material we present a rhizomal narrative as a means of 
understanding the Self as narrative performance. We conclude with a brief 
discussion of some of the advantages of this way of conceptualizing and 
representing the Self. 
 
There is much written about the relationship between narrative 
and the Self, and also much on the notion of narrative as performance. 
These two aspects of narrative discourse together raise some important 
questions for those of us who are attempting to explore issues pertaining 
to the Self. Do they suggest that there is a life, a Self, separate from the 
performance, and that performance is a more or less accurate 
representation of that life? Or is the life, the Self, constituted in and/or by 
the performance, having no other reality than that which exists while it is 
being performed? And in either case, what is the nature of the Self being 
performed? We come to these questions not primarily from a desire to 
philosophize (though we will be engaging in such throughout this article) 
but from a professional concern with the implications of possible answers 
to these questions. We are social workers, one newly qualified, the other 
of some years standing, now teaching social work. Understanding 
individuals in context is the essence of our chosen profession. How we 
understand individuals, their lives, and their identities makes a significant 
difference to our assessment procedures, our interventions, our 
evaluations of circumstances and behaviours and, of course, our 
relationships with service users. This paper is not, however, an article 
primarily about the concerns of social work, but an exploration of a 
                                                        
1 This article is a revised and extended version of Baldwin & Hill (2012).  
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particular way of understanding the Self that we believe may be of 
interest to narrative scholars. 
In essence, our argument is that we need to develop a way of 
conceptualizing and re-presenting the Self that addresses some of the 
philosophical, cultural, and representational failings of two foregrounded 
frameworks for understanding the Self: the essentialist Self and the 
relational or dialogical Self. These failings, we argue, can be addressed 
well, although perhaps not entirely, through a rhizomal narrative 
framework of the Self, incorporating insights from the every growing 
field of narrative and the philosophy of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 
The way we will develop our argument is thus. Following some 
introductory remarks we will outline the two frameworks of the Self that 
we take issue with (the essentialist and the dialogical), indicating the 
problems we see in each. We will then outline what we call the rhizomal 
Self, a Self that is de-centred, multiplicitous, fluid, and, in Deleuzo-
Guattarian terms, nomadic. In the following section we attempt to 
illustrate this rhizomal Self using autobiographical material, primarily 
from one of us (CH). Finally, we will discuss some further features of the 
rhizomal Self and indicate some of the areas in which further work is 
required.  
 
A Narrative Understanding of the Self 
 
The extensive and expansive literature on the relationship between 
narrative and the Self that cuts across disciplines such as philosophy 
(MacIntyre, 1984; Taylor, 1989; Ricoeur, 1991; Strawson, 2004; Currie, 
2010); the social sciences (Somers, 1994; Day Sclater, 1998; Guerrero, 
2011); psychology (Bruner, 1987, 2006; Schechtman, 1997; McAdams, 
2006, 2008); and literature (Eakin, 1999, 2008; Vice, 2003; Snaevarr, 
2007) falls, we think, along a spectrum at one end of which there are 
those authors who see narrative as reflecting, or as a window upon, a Self 
that exists prior to, and independently of, that narrative and at the other 
end of which we have narrative as constitutive of the Self, that is the view 
that without narrative there is no Self to understand (Schechtman, 1996). 
Wherever along this spectrum one takes a position, narrative can be seen 
as being relevant to understanding the Self because, like the Self, it 
requires agency and opportunity to be realized. As such, narrative (and 
thus the Self) can be seen as performative regardless of whether one sees 
the Self as a unified, singular whole as in the essentialist position, or the 
decentred, multiplicity of the dialogical position.  
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The Essentialist Self 
 
The essentialist Self is the Self that, starting with Augustine’s 
invention of the “inner self” (Cary, 2003), developed through a range of 
practices in the 11th and 12th centuries, (Morris, 1987), was formulated 
more rigorously by philosophers such as Descartes in the “I” of cogito 
ergo sum and Locke (1836) as “a thinking, intelligent being, that has 
reason and reflection, and can consider itself, as itself, the same thinking 
thing in different times and places” (p. 225). The essentialist Self found 
its resting place in modernist psychology as a being with frontiers, 
separate from others, with its own distinct personality, beliefs, and 
attitudes, that encapsulates the idea of continuity in that the Self at time t
1
 
is, at least in most significant respects, the same as the Self at time t
2
. It is 
a Self that can be considered as a centred, individual subject that can be 
known “as a bounded, unique individual, more or less integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe; a dynamic center of awareness, 
emotion, judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and set 
contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and 
natural background” (Geertz, 1974, p. 1). This is also the autonomous, 
stable, unified, and coherent Self of Western liberalism, discussed by St. 
Pierre (1997), that frames individuals within a socio-legal discourse of 
rights and citizenship and which holds individuals accountable for past 
actions. For example, “this is the individual who abused this child and 
this Self and no other should be held responsible” or that “it is I and no 
other Self that should receive credit or compensation for my sacrifice and 
service” (see Schechtman, 1996). This is the sense of Self that lies 
implicit when people say of their relative with dementia, “Oh, he’s not the 
person he was,” or “She’s not the woman I married.” 
This understanding of the Self is, we suggest, an example of a 
“line of articulation” that frames an individual through three strata: 
organism, significance, and subjectification. The first, organism, points to 
the necessity to be organized as a body; the second, significance, to being 
interpreted through hierarchical language; the third, subjectification, to 
the requirement to become a clearly identifiable, singular self. (See 
Markula, 2006, for a discussion of these strata.) Through the process of 
articulation the individual is framed/constructed as conforming to the 
demands and expectations of ordered classifications, themselves linear, 
fixed, hierarchical/vertical, and deeply rooted (“arborescent,” in Deleuzo-
Guattarian terms), as found, for example, in terms such as the “good 
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employee,” the “effective manager,” or, in social work, the “rogue” or 
“dangerous” mother (see Bergeron, 1996, on this last articulation). 
While this understanding of the Self may be widespread and even 
common-sensical, it is problematic in a number of ways. First, there are 
problems with the notion of psychological continuity that is fundamental 
to this view of the Self (see Schechtman, 1996). Second, given that 
humans are social beings, it seems to have little to say about how ongoing 
interactions with others shape the Self. Ongoing, everyday interactions 
appear to be simply meetings of already-formed Selves that react to other 
Selves in particular ways. It is thus a somewhat atomistic notion of the 
Self and one in which there seems to be little, if any, room for 
fundamental change, ongoing formation, or becoming through 
interactions with others. This stability or fixity does not sit well with the 
therapeutic aims of social work: helping people to change, to become 
different. Third, it allows for individuals to be excluded from the status of 
personhood, depending on the criteria used; see for example, Brock 
(1993), who excludes individuals with severe dementia from the 
“personhood club”: “The dementia that destroys memory in the severely 
demented destroys their capacities to forge links across time that establish 
a sense of personal identity across time. Hence, they lack personhood” (p. 
373). 
 
The Dialogical Self 
 
If the essentialist Self forms one end of a spectrum of positions to 
be taken on what constitutes the Self, at the other end is the relational or 
dialogical Self, that perceives the Self in a more social and fluid fashion. 
This is the decentred, social Self that we find in authors such as Salgado 
and Clegg (2011), who note that “Self-identity becomes a matter of 
socially situating oneself and negotiating with others one’s own 
identity—the fixed self becomes fluid, socially constituted, and unstable” 
(p. 424). Having no central “I” to control or coordinate multiple aspects 
of an independent Self, the subject is viewed as multiple “I’s” each with 
its own voice, position, and worldview. These “I’s” may compete or 
conflict with one another and the Self is thus, in Bakhtin’s terms, 
polyphonous, having a “multiplicity of worlds, with each world having its 
own author telling a story relatively independent of the authors of the 
other worlds” (Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992, p.28). In the 
example in the second part of this paper, it is thus possible to see such 
multiplicity (on a limited scale) in the “military” and “social work” 
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selves. Further, the Self is embodied and shaped by social relations, the 
dialogical Self being understood as expressing “the juxtaposition of 
personally experienced social corporeality” which “grants us a richer role 
of sociality beyond that of intersubjective exchange” (Cresswell & 
Baerveldt, 2011, p. 272). In other words, we are continually shaped in our 
interactions with others, the Self being thoroughly contextual. For us, as 
social workers, the continual performance of Self in relation to individual, 
communal, institutional, political, economic, cultural, and societal 
contexts is the essence of our work, aiding others to negotiate a livable 
Self materially, psychologically, socially, and spiritually.  
There are, however, limitations to this framework. The emphasis 
on the socially constructed Self seems to place the Self entirely at the 
mercy of social context without allocating it any agentive capacity. An 
extreme version of this would be represented by Woody Allen’s character 
Zelig (Allen, 1983), who morphs into the body types, speech patterns and 
behaviours of people around him—quite literally embodying all of his 
social interactions and relationships. 
The problem with the dialogical Self thus conceived is how to 
allow for agentivity in Self construction—the Self being a performance 
but not a puppet. Again, agentivity is important to social work, as it seeks 
to empower, to promote independence, and to enable people to fashion, 
create, invent, and discover for themselves ways of being in the world. 
 
The Rhizomal Self 
 
One way of envisioning the Self that avoids both the rigidity and 
asociality of the essentialist Self and the passive, ineluctable malleability 
of the dialogic Self is as a rhizome, an interconnected collection of nodes 
or narratives spread horizontally across time and space without 
predefined shape or direction (see Figure 1). The rhizomal Self defies 
subjectification, the requirement for a clearly defined singular identity. 
Multiplicity, multi-vocality, discontinuity and fragmentation can all be 
accommodated within the rhizomal narrative—the Self being compared to 
“a buzzing beehive so agile and inconsistent, we can barely keep track of 
it” (Rosseel, 2001, p.127, cited in Sermijn, Devlieger, & Loots, 2008, p. 
637). In the rhizomal Self, the nodes, consisting of individual narratives, 
narrative fragments or traces, capture something of what it is to be that 
individual, but neither define the individual nor form resting points at 
which we can claim an understanding of “who that person is.” Rather, 
they are passage points for what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call “lines 
 
6      BALDWIN, GREASON, & HILL: RHIZOMAL SELF 
 
 
of flight.” Lines of flight seek to make connections, to deterritorialize or 
disrupt unity and coherence and thus open up possibilities for becoming 
“other.” It is therefore the pathways between nodes that shape the Self in 
time and context. The Self, forever on the move between nodes, is thus 
nomadic. In this way, the rhizomal framework of Self captures agentivity 
in that the movement between nodes can be purposeful and meaningful, 
yet also highly social because the direction of movement is influenced but 
not determined by others and context. Such lines of flight can be seen in 
the contestation of essentialist and heteronormative categories of identity 
within queer and crip theory discussed by McRuer (2006) or the 
experimentations of Australian performance artist Stelarc (2012), who 
challenges notions of fixedness in arborescent thinking by breaking down 
traditional conceptualizations of the unity and stability of the body 
through performances such as his third mechanical arm project or the 
grafting of a third ear onto his arm. For social workers, such 
heterogeneity sits well with the commitment to cultural diversity, the 
uniqueness of the individual, the promotion of empowerment, and so on.  
While the rhizomal, nomadic Self has, we think, certain 
advantages over the essentialist and dialogic frameworks, we still need to 
find a way of representing that Self that is understandable and it is to this 
we turn in the next section where we present autobiographical material in 
rhizomal form. 
 
Performing the Rhizomal Self 
 
In order to illustrate this notion of the Self, we here present a 
rhizomal narrative, simplified in terms of the number of nodes and 
possible connections (real-life rhizomes being far more complex and 
fluid). Figure 1 presents the rhizome visually so that the reader may have 
a sense of how nodes can be linked, though ideally the shape and 
structure of the rhizome would remain unknown (see the discussion 
section).  
We have endeavoured, within the constraints of a linear text, 
rather than a hypertext, to present this rhizome as an interactive narrative, 
at once a performance by [CH] presenting aspects of her life in a flexible, 
decentred, constitutive, nomadic way and the reader who, in choosing 
possible pathways, has the text perform according to the choices made. 
Nodes, each represented by a symbol such as #, %, * and so on, capture 
personal, familial, communal, societal or discoursal passage points or 
narratives through which the reader can follow and come to know the 
 
NARRATIVE WORKS 8 (1/2)      7 
 
 
author [CH]. Each node carries a symbol rather than a number or letter so 
as to avoid the suggestion that there is a preferred starting point for 
entering the rhizome or a preferred pathway once in it. The rhizome is 
designed with the modest intention of demonstrating possible tensions 
and convergences between the military and social work selves and can be 
read in a number of ways. First, one might read it through as it appears 
just as one might read a more traditional autobiography. This would 
provide one understanding of [CH]. Alternatively, the reader may start 
with the first section and then move to other sections as indicated by the 
symbols following the text (it is possible to move from one section to 
another by clicking on the symbol), creating a pathway along which 
another understanding of [CH] emerges. Or, again, one might start at any 
node, and move along a pathway of one’s own choosing. Alternatively, it 
is possible to access each node in whatever order one chooses. Each of 
these approaches will constitute a new narrative performance, and thus a 
different understanding, of [CH]. 
 





The Rhizomal Narrative 
 
My swearing-in ceremony was a fancy affair, a one-off public 
affairs stunt aimed at garnering support for an increasingly 
unpopular military. Most new military members attend a quiet reception 
at their local barracks or armoury; I was sworn in with hundreds of other 
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new recruits by the Minister of National Defence, Chief of Defence Staff, 
and Prime Minister of Canada at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa. 
We were served a full-course dinner on white tablecloths. Dignitaries 
toasted our patriotism and loyalty to our country. Entertainment included 
a demonstration of rappelling techniques from a squadron of helicopters 
flying overhead. Other than commending the bravery of the troops, there 
was little mention of the Canadian military mission in Afghanistan. # > ~ 
 
I graduated from Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) training on 
a Friday afternoon, ranked third in my class of 58 recruits. We 
were a mix of regular and reserve force army, navy, and air force 
members. Women were outnumbered 4:1. Of the five highest-ranked 
graduates, three were women; my roommate was also awarded the top 
shot prize for highest shooting accuracy on the range. My female platoon 
mates and I thrived in the adrenaline- and testosterone-fuelled 
environment and we never let anyone question our capability as soldiers-
in-training. We all had different reasons for joining the military—
adventure, travel, rebellion, money. Basic training was a summer-long 
mind game, instructor vs. recruit. I did well because I refused to take all 
of the military rah-rah seriously. When I giggled in the ranks, I completed 
my prescribed push-ups without complaint, but no punishment could stop 
me from smiling gleefully up at the drill commander as he screamed 
“Ordinary Seaman Hill, why are you so goddamn happy to be here?” I 
was seventeen years old, living away from home, making tons of new 
friends, and being paid a heck of a lot of money to do it. It was like 






Here I am (left) with a friend in 
the field phase of my Basic 
Military Qualification course.  











Excerpt from Letter to the Editor: 
 
As a member of the Canadian Forces and a full-time student, I was 
interested to read of the recent “die-in” protesting military recruitment 
on campus. I wish to contribute to the discussion on “what kind of 
people” are attracted to recruiting stations, and to the Canadian Forces 
as a whole. In almost two years with the Canadian Forces Reserve, I have 
realized that it is unnecessary and inappropriate to make generalizations 
about the type of people attracted to a military career. At my current 
place of employment with Montreal’s Naval Reserve unit, I work 
alongside people from all walks of life. Some live with their parents and 
attend college. Some work full time for the military. Some have full-time 
jobs as professionals in various fields. The vast majority, however, are 
students. There are students of biology, religion, and political science. 
Others are studying architecture, engineering, or philosophy. Many are 
working on a professional or second degree. In short, I am in very good 
company. There are many intelligent, hard-working people from diverse 
backgrounds working in the Canadian Forces. # / ! = { 
 
I wrote this letter to the editor in response to an article I read 
describing a “die-in” protest of military recruitment on my 
university campus. I felt that the article was very one sided, and as a 
member of the military and a student, I wished to contribute to the 
discussion. This seems like a straightforward process, and it would have 
been for any civilian writing to a public newspaper. However, as a 
military member, I was required to have my letter vetted by the Canadian 
Forces public affairs section. I submitted my letter to my military unit, 
who in turn sent it on to the area public affairs representative. This entire 
process took several weeks. Even though a letter to the editor clearly 
reflects the opinion of the submitter, military members are not permitted 
to publicly comment on the military without express permission from 
Canadian Forces public affairs. In a world where words are constantly 
reinterpreted by the press and the public, the military is incredibly 
cautious about public and media scrutiny. ^ 
 
My grandfather passed away the day before my ship sailed for a 
deployment to Bermuda and the Eastern Seaboard. He had been 
shipped off to war at 21 years of age, the same age I was when he died. I 
sent him letters every summer detailing my adventures with the Navy. 
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When he passed away, I was on the other side of the world, thousands of 
miles away and unable to attend the funeral. Instead, I sent him one final 
letter: When I was little I used to sit on your knee and ask you to tell me 
the longest story in the world—you would recount stories of your days in 
the Navy, postings all over the Continent and throughout the Middle East, 
languages learned and sites seen. I know now that you must have been 
filtering your stories carefully for my young ears, leaving out the horrors 
of war and replacing them with the beauty that you managed to see 
amidst the destruction. My grandmother told me after his death that he 
had rarely discussed the war with anyone. # & { % 
 
 
When I moved to New Brunswick and enrolled in my social work 
degree, I transferred from the Naval Reserve unit in Montreal to 
the Naval Reserve unit in Saint John. As a reservist, I continue to work 
one night per week and over some weekends when I am not under long-
term contract. For me, this has always meant that I work part time for the 
military during the school year, and dedicate the summer months to full-
time employment as a sailor. # = 
 
He was a Corporal in the infantry, a gambler trying to kick the 
habit before his late summer wedding. His fiancée was not aware 
of his expensive hobby. He had been deployed to Afghanistan twice and 
was expecting a third deployment in the New Year. We worked our way 
through the Addictions intake sheet quickly, chatting easily about his 
background. I [CH] asked him if he had ever received counseling services 
in the past; he replied that he had. I asked him if he would be able to 
elaborate. He spoke of the deaths of six friends in the same roadside 
attack. They were in his battalion; he was lucky to be alive. He lost his 
roommate and suffered from severe nightmares and flashbacks for years 
after. His grief counselor used exposure therapy, made him watch movies 
that reminded him of his dead roommate. I sat in front of him, speechless. 
He was only a year or two older than me. I felt like a child play-acting at 
an adult’s very important job. * = { 
 
The Bishop tells us: “When the boys come back 
They will not be the same; for they’ll have fought 
  In a just cause…” 
 “We’re none of us the same!” the boys reply 
“For George lost both his legs; and Bill’s stone blind; … 
 
NARRATIVE WORKS 8 (1/2)      11 
 
 
 “And Bert’s gone syphilitic; you’ll not find 
 “A chap who’s served that hasn’t found some change.”  
 (Siegfried Sassoon, “They,” 1917/1984)  + > ~ = % 
 
My supervisor had been working with him for months, and we 
had tracked his case at our weekly Mental Health meetings. She 
was distraught at his suicide; they grew up in the same small community 
and she knew his family. A memorial service was held at the base; the 
father called out to his son’s former co-workers, begging them to seek 
help for post-traumatic symptoms so often pushed aside. The family 
called for a “Highway of Heroes” to bring him home, asking only that he 
be given the same honour as soldiers killed in combat. Later, talking to a 
number of reporters, his father repeated the same line over and over: “He 
may not have been killed in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan is what killed 
him.” * & = { % 
 
My decision to undertake a student placement at the local forces’ 
base was rooted in my desire to merge my military role with my 
social work role. The reality of working for the army element of the 
military was very different from my own experience in the navy. Real 
war is ugly, and it does not end when soldiers return home. I was not 
prepared for the inconceivable pain experienced by many of the soldiers 
and their families. At times I felt ill-equipped to handle my new role. My 
supervisors were experienced and truly incredible in their respective 
roles. They provided me with guidance and always seemed to have the 
best interests of their clients at heart. I eventually realized that even that 
could not prevent the inevitable tragedies that occur in this line of work.  
At the mental health clinic, the military tagline, “If the soldier isn’t 
deployable, he’s not employable,” is law. Social work confidentiality 
rules (harm to self, harm to others) go out the window; the social work 
officer is first and foremost a military officer, and illicit behaviours such 
as drug and alcohol misuse may be reported to the client’s commanding 
officer. The responsibility to the client is replaced by the responsibility of 
keeping the military machine running as smoothly as possible. Over the 
course of my placement, I realized that I could not function as a military 
social work officer within this system because I would never be willing to 
compromise my professional ethics for the sake of the military institution. 
By the end of my three months at the base, it was clear to me that my 
social work identity was slowly replacing my military identity. ^ @ & ? { 
 
 







Here I am (left) riding in a troop carrier 
with my social work placement supervisor. 
We were on our way to visit troops 
conducting a week-long exercise in the 
field. When we arrived in the training area, 
it was windy, freezing cold, and pouring 
rain. It was not lost on me that if I were 
taking part in the exercise as a military 
member rather than visiting as a social work intern, I would not be 
returning to the comfort of a heated vehicle and a cozy bed at the end of 
the day. Instead, I would have another week of wind and rain to look 
forward to, hunkered down in my dugout trying to stay warm, far from 
the comforts of home. = / 
 
I stand on the parade square in a packed arena. I am in the front 
row, dead center. My uniform is pressed, my boots are shined, 
and my hair is in a tight bun at the nape of my neck. As the drillmaster 
orders us to stand at ease, the opening strains of “Amazing Grace” begin 
to play. The first wreath is laid on the cenotaph, borne by an elderly 
veteran who walks slowly and carefully with the assistance of a cane. I 
think of my grandfather, and feel tears well up in my eyes. I will myself 
to keep it together. There are thousands of people watching; television 
crews cross back and forth in front of our platoon. I stare directly ahead, 
focusing on the shine of the parade commander’s boots, the light 
sprinkling of dandruff lingering on our platoon officer’s shoulders, the 
dull ache of my feet in my flat-bottomed parade boots—anything to keep 
my mind occupied. The next wreath is laid by a veteran of our modern era 
of conflict. He walks toward the cenotaph clutching the hand of a young 
girl, who I imagine must be his daughter. She wears a sparkly dress and a 
ribbon in her hair. I think of my former clients, broken and lost upon 
returning home from the deadly desert. It is not the deployment that 
breaks them, but the return home to normalcy. They are no longer normal. 
Tears start to slide slowly down my cheeks. I feel one trickle into my ear. 
I clench my fists at my sides, digging my fingernails into my palms. I 
lock my knees, then unlock them, then lock them again. I bite the inside 
of my cheek. I try to prevent the inevitable. The procession of veterans 
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and mourners continues, laying wreath after wreath on the simple stone 
cenotaph. As the bugler begins “The Last Post,” we stand at attention and 
our platoon officer raises his right hand in a strong salute. Across the 
parade square, a WW2 veteran comes to attention and struggles to raise 
his right hand to his brow. He holds his salute for a few seconds, until the 
intense shaking of his arm forces him to lower it down to his side. After a 
few moments, he tries again. Up and down, up and down, he tries so hard 
but his body is not as strong as it was once. The last mournful notes echo 
in the large arena. Tears are streaming down my cheeks, my nose is 
running, my composure completely lost. A thousand thoughts compete 
for space in my head. * # + > ~ = % [ 
 
I] think of Siegfried Sassoon’s (1947/1984) poem, “At the 
Cenotaph”:  
 
  I saw the Prince of Darkness, with his Staff 
  Standing bare-headed by the Cenotaph….  
  “Make them forget, O Lord, what this Memorial 
  Means; their discredited ideas revive; … 
  Lift up their hearts in large destructive lust; …  
  The Prince of Darkness to the Cenotaph 
  Bowed.  As he walked away I heard him laugh. + ~ { [ - 
 
The first time I heard Sassoon’s poem, “At the Cenotaph,” I was 
in my narrative social work class. CB was the instructor, and he 
presented a slide with the text of the poem, giving us several minutes to 
read and consider Sassoon’s words. I remember being blown away by the 
mixed emotions invoked by this poem. The idea of forgetting those killed 
in war, of forgetting the veterans we continue to thank so adamantly for 
their service year after year, was shocking to me. At the same time, it 
occurred to me that this would be a small price to pay for a world that 
knows only peace, so much so that a war memorial loses all meaning and 
significance. The following day was Remembrance Day.     { % - 
 
I [CB] first heard Sassoon’s poem in Mr. Emmett’s English class. 
As a bored teenager I wasn’t enamoured with the war poets and 
following the exam I promptly forgot about it. But some years later, 
seeing Margaret Thatcher, the then prime minister and architect of the 
Falklands war, standing at the Cenotaph, the first line was disinterred 
from the depths of memory: “I saw the Prince of Darkness, with his 
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Staff.” Sassoon may have had the gender wrong, but his poem was 
prescient. % [ } 
 
As far as I [CB] remember, I was against war, all wars, long 
before I understood what it meant to be a pacifist. I was involved 
in, or a member of, all sorts of organizations in the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament, the Campaign Against the Arms Trade, the Peace Tax 
Campaign (now Conscience), Christian Movement for Peace and could 
make the intellectual links between peace issues and international 
development, peace and justice, and (contra Aquinas’ theological 
arguments for the Just War) between “pacifism” and faith. But it was 
Utah Phillips (1993), recounting the words of Ammon Hennacy, that 
struck home: “You came into the world armed to the teeth. With an 
arsenal of weapons, weapons of privilege, economic privilege, sexual 
privilege, racial privilege. You want to be a pacifist, you’re not just going 
to have to give up guns, knives, clubs, hard, angry words, you are going 
to have lay down the weapons of privilege and go into the world 
completely disarmed.” (I do not know where I first heard these words, but 
they are to be found on Utah Phillips’ album, I’ve Got To Know). And, as 
with Utah Phillips, I find it a constant struggle. - < 
 
I [CB] have always had a fondness for the Industrial Workers of 
the World, the Wobblies, what I once heard referred to as the 
smallest mass movement in the world. Joe Hill’s songs, the stories of 
Utah Phillips—their passion resonate with my desire for a better world 




This way of conceptualizing the Self—as a rhizomal narrative— 
has, we believe, advantages over both the essentialist and the dialogical 
frameworks of the Self. The notion of the narrative Self has been 
constructed in a number of ways that, at times, can be conflicting and 
confusing (Smith & Sparkes, 2008). Smith and Sparkes (2008) provide a 
typology for viewing and understanding the varied conceptualizations of 
the Self by presenting five perspectives (the psychosocial, the inter-
subjective, the storied resource, the dialogic, and the performative) along 
a continuum. The notion of the rhizomal Self adds a sixth 
conceptualization of the narrative Self and in the future it would be 
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beneficial and illuminating to explore how and where the rhizomal Self 
fits on the continuum (Smith & Sparkes, 2008).  
Ideally, the rhizomal Self should be presented as hypertext so that 
the reader has neither a map of the rhizome nor access to all nodes. We 
have presented the rhizome, both map and content, here as a means to 
illustrate how the rhizomal Self might work as a framework for 
understanding an individual in context. We ask the reader for the rest of 
the discussion to imagine how the above text might appear in hypertext 
form, with the reader having access to the present node and the links from 
that node and without knowledge of the shape or extent of the rhizome as 
a whole. Further, having read the text, in whatever way chosen, we now 
invite you to return to it and reread it in other ways, choosing different 
pathways, and keeping in mind how this (second, third or fourth) reading 
is different from previous ones.  
One advantage of this hypertextual way of reading the 
autobiographical material is that it reflects in some ways the way we 
come to know others. Most of our interactions with others start part way 
through their lives and we come to know them through our interactions 
with them, interactions that are dependent upon the situation, our 
interpretations of what they tell us, their choices regarding self-disclosure, 
choices themselves dependent upon context and how they regard us. In 
other words, coming to know someone is not the linear process of a 
traditional autobiography but a piecing together of fragments from which 
we take out clues from what is disclosed as to which pathways to follow.  
Another advantage with this way of visualising the Self is that, 
with the author establishing possible pathways between nodes, the 
framework extends the agentivity of the dialogical Self, through control 
over how access to nodes is granted, while, on the other hand, allowing 
for the reader to participate in the construction of the autobiography 
through the choices of pathway to be followed. The Self thus becomes a 
dynamic between the author and the reader that captures both agentivity 
and sociality. 
Further, there is the possibility of including pointers to other 
narratives, thus illustrating how our lives touch on, and are touched by, 
those of others. In our example, these are represented by the nodes that 
form part of CH’s rhizome (blue and red) and part of CB’s rhizome 
(yellow). In this way our individual stories become part of each other’s 
rhizome—a further capturing of the social Self. 
At the same time, this rhizomal approach can accommodate the 
notion of central stories—that is, stories that are highly connected with 
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other stories. In our example above, the nodes =, {, and ^ are examples of 
this. Taking the notion of centrality from social network analysis, we can 
view such central stories as either locally central—that is, it is connected 
with many stories in its local environment—or globally central in that it 
holds a “position of strategic significance in the overall structure of the 
network” (Scott, 1991, p. 85). Therefore, such stories can be viewed as 
being more central to understanding the individual than others, though not 
in and of themselves capturing any essentialist Self as such stories are 
simply well-connected passage points in multiple lines of flight. 
In addition, the framework allows for separate Selves (illustrated 
above in the military and social work selves, themselves represented by 
the blue and red nodes respectively) to exist alongside each other, 
capturing a sense of multiplicity. For example, if one followed the 
pathway @ * # ^ ! / (the blue nodes in Figure 1) one would understand 
CH in primarily a military context; if alternatively, one followed ~ > = ? 
(the red nodes) it is the social work self that is foregrounded. The two 
pathways set apart the two Selves and it might be the case that, depending 
on the pathway followed the reader might have no knowledge of the other 
Self. The rhizomal framework, however, does allow for connections to be 
made between different Selves, as illustrated in Figure 1). These are 
points in lives where multiple Selves touch upon one another. In this way, 
complex configurations of the Self are possible within a rhizomal 
narrative that are less easily available in traditional linear ways of 
presenting autobiographies. 
Consequently, adopting a rhizomal Self theoretical approach to 
frontline social work is particularly beneficial for service users for a 
number of reasons. A rhizomal Self approach gives the service user more 
control; it does not see individuals as “fixed” by particular challenges or 
concerns; it is more creative, allowing for multiple pathways of 
understanding; it challenges the dominant medical model, allowing for 
more empowering outcomes; and it fits well with anti-oppressive practice. 
For example, for individuals living with body integrity identity disorder 
(BIID), the lines of articulations are often psychiatry, medical, unethical, 
crazy, evil, etc. With a rhizomal Self approach, BIID can be understood 
by various lines of fligh,t such as pretending, second life, freedom, 
amputating your own leg, etc. In this way, we see there is not any one 
way to live with BIID.  
Finally, the rhizomal Self presented above is inherently unstable 
and transient. Each reading constitutes a different Self depending upon 
the pathway taken. Thus, in our example above, how we understand ({), 
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standing at the cenotaph, depends at least in part, on whether we have 
first read (%), the Sassoon poem. Is the reflection at the cenotaph 
prompted by the poem or does the poem have personal significance only 
following the reflection? This interpretative uncertainty is part and parcel 
of understanding others. 
These advantages, we think, are enough to warrant further 
exploration of the possibilities of the rhizomal Self. Such explorations 
could take the form of rhizomal autobiographies, experiments with 
hypertext, theoretical musings on the nature of rhizomal narratives, or the 
application of the framework in a range of settings (for example, social 
work assessments). We offer such possibilities in the hope that this paper, 




Allen, W. (1983). Zelig [Motion Picture]. Los Angeles, CA: Orion Pictures. 
Baldwin, C., & Hill, C. (2012). Hypertext as an expression of the rhizomatic self.  In 
NHT 12: Proceedings of the 2nd Workshop on Narrative and Hypertext, ACM 
Conference on Hypertext and Social Media (pp. 23–28). New York, NY: 
Association of Computing Machinery. Retrieved from 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2310083&dl=ACM&coll=DL&CFID=12526
7578&CFTOKEN=21524817 
Bergeron, M. L. (1996). Hegemony, law and psychiatry: A perspective on the systemic 
oppression of “rogue mothers.” In S. Aaron (Ed.), Feminist legal studies IV(1), 
49–72.  
Brock, D. W. (1993). Life and death: Philosophical essays in biomedical ethics. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Bruner, J. (1987). Life as narrative. Social Research 54(2), 11–32. 
Bruner, J. S. (2006). In search of pedagogy: The selected works of Jerome S. Bruner. 
London, England: Routledge. 
Cary, P. (2003). Augustine's invention of the inner self: The legacy of a Christian 
Platonist. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. 
Cresswell, J., & Baerveldt, C. (2011). Bakhtin’s realism and embodiment: Towards a 
revision of the dialogical self. Culture & Psychology, 17(2), 263–77.  
Currie, G. (2010). Narrative and narrators: A philosophy of stories. Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press. 
Day Sclater, S. (1998). Creating the self: Stories as transitional phenomena. 
Auto/biography, 6, 85–92. 
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1987). A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Eakin, P. J. (1999). How our lives become stories: Making selves. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Eakin, P. J. (2008). Living autobiographically: How we create identity in narrative. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
18      BALDWIN, GREASON, & HILL: RHIZOMAL SELF 
 
 
Geertz, C. (1974). From the native's point of view: On the nature of anthropological 
understanding. Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 28(1), 
26–45.  
Guerrero, A. L. (2011). Narrative as resource for the display of self and identity: The 
narrative construction of an oppositional identity. Colombian Applied 
Linguistics Journal, 13(2), 88–99.  
Hermans, H. J. M., Kempen, H. J. G., & van Loon, R. J. P. (1992). The dialogical self: 
Beyond individualism and rationalism. American Psychologist, 47(1), 23–33.  
Locke, J. (1836). An essay concerning human understanding, 27th ed. London, England: 
Tegg and Son. 
MacIntyre, A. (1984). After virtue: A study in moral theory. Notre Dame, IN: University 
of Notre Dame Press. 
Markula, P. H. (2006) The dancing body without organs: Deleuze, femininity, and 
performing research. Qualitative Inquiry 12(1), 3–27. 
McAdams, D. P. (2006). The redemptive self: Stories Americans live by. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
McAdams, D. P. (2008). Personal narratives and the life story in O. John, R. Robins, & 
L. A. Pervin (Eds.). Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 241–
261). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
McRuer, R. (2006). Crip theory: Cultural signs of queerness and disability. New York, 
NY: New York University Press. 
Morris, C. (1987). The discovery of the individual, 1050–1200. Toronto, Canada: 
University of Toronto Press/Medieval Academy of America. 
Ricoeur, P. (1991). Life in quest of narrative. In Wood D. (Ed.) On Paul Ricoeur: 
Narrative and interpretation (pp 29–33). London, England: Routledge,. 
Rosseel, E. (2001). Het onschatbare subject. Aspecten van het postmoderne zelf [The 
invaluable subject:Aspects of the postmodern self]. Brussels, Belgium: VUB 
Press. 
Salgado, J. & Clegg, J. (2011). Dialogism and the psyche: Bakhtin and contemporary 
psychology. Culture & Psychology, 17(4), 421–440. 
Sassoon, S. (1984). At the Cenotaph. The collected poems. London: Faber & Faber. 
(Original work published 1947) 
Sassoon, S. (1984). They. The collected poems. London: Faber & Faber. (Original work 
published 1917) 
Schechtman, M. (1996). The constitution of selves. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. 
Scott, J. (1991). Social network analysis: A handbook. London, England: Sage. 
Sermijn, J., Devlieger, P., & Loots, G. (2008). The narrative construction of the self: 
Selfhood as a rhizomal story. Qualitative Inquiry 14(4), 632–50.  
Smith, B., & Sparkes, A. C. (2008). Contrasting perspectives on narrating selves and 
identities: An invitation to dialogue. Qualitative Research, 8(1), 5–35.  
St. Pierre, E. A. (1997). A critique of the rational individual of liberal democracy. ERIC 
Document Reproduction Service No. ED407441. 
Somers, M. R. (1994). The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network 
approach. Theory and Society, 23(5), 605–649. 
Stelarc. (2012). Ear on arm. Retrieved from http://stelarc.org/?catID=20242  
Phillips, U. (1993). What is a pacifist? I've got to know. Oakland, CA: AK Press. 
Snaevarr, S. (2007, March/April). Don Quixote and the narrative self. Philosophy Now, 
60. Retrieved from 
http://philosophynow.org/issues/60/Don_Quixote_and_The_Narrative_Self  
 
NARRATIVE WORKS 8 (1/2)      19 
 
 
Strawson, G. (2004). Against narrativity. Ratio, 17(4), 428–452. 
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Vice, S. (2003). Literature and the narrative self. Philosophy, 78(1): 93–108. 
 
  
Clive Baldwin, PhD, is Canada Research Chair in Narrative Studies and a 
Professor in the School of Social Work at St. Thomas University, Fredericton, 
NB, Canada. He is currently working on a number of research projects: on the 
use of narrative in social and health care, on resilience and narrative, and on 
transableism, the desire to become disabled. He has published articles and book 
chapters on ethics and technology, ethics and dementia, narrative and law with 
respect to child abuse, rhetoric in expert reports, and Munchausen syndrome by 
proxy. His most recent book is Narrative Social Work: Theory and Application 
(Policy Press, 2013). He is Contributing Editor of Narrative Works. 
 
Michelle Greason, PhD, is a qualified social worker, who has recently 
completed doctoral studies. She currently teaches at St. Thomas University in 
Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, and is a Research Associate in the 
Centre for Interdisciplinary Research on Narrative. Her work focuses on ethics 
and ethical reasoning in long-term care, and the interaction between provincial 
and organizational policies and ethics in everyday practice. She plans to do 
further work in the field of citizenship, specifically theorizing and researching 
micro-citizenship as a practice in dementia- and long-term care. 
  
Carolyn Hill, BSW, is a graduate of the Social Work program at St. Thomas 
University, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, and is currently completing a 
Master of Public Policy at the University of Sydney in Australia, where she also 
works as a Senior Consultant with the Nous Group, an Australian management 
consulting firm. She served with the Canadian Navy for six years and has a 
keen interest in transformational leadership.   
 
